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Abstract:
After an investigation lasting several months, in June 1998 the Federal Trade Commission
brought an antitrust lawsuit against Intel Corporation based on Intel’s conduct towards Intergraph,
and similar conduct towards Digital Equipment Corporation and Compaq, all in the context of
disputes where Intel was accused of patent infringement.  The FTC charged that Intel’s practices
were an abuse of Intel’s monopoly position in microprocessors.  Is Intel’s conduct anti-competitive
and thus illegal under the antitrust laws?  That is the central question explored in this paper.
An introductory section provides some background for the case by discussing the tension
between intellectual property rights and antitrust law, a tension that is evident in the FTC’s dispute
with Intel, and by describing the role of patents in the semiconductor industry.  Section 3 provides
a succinct summary of the facts surrounding Intel’s conduct in each of the three patent disputes
identified by the FTC.  Section 4 explains the FTC’s theory of how Intel’s conduct was anti-
competitive. Section 5 presents Intel’s response.  Section 6 describes the settlement reached
between the FTC and Intel.  The final section discusses legal and economic developments since
the case was settled and remarks on the lasting implications of the Intel case.
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1.   Introduction 
When do hardball negotiating tactics constitute violations of the antitrust laws?  Consider the 
following fact pattern, which reflects real-world events during the 1997-1998 time frame: 
Intel is the leading manufacturing of high-end microprocessors, the brains of personal 
computers and workstations.  Intergraph Corporation makes computer workstations that 
use Intel’s microprocessors.  Intel gives Intergraph, a valued customer, access to Intel’s 
trade secrets (which are very useful when building computers based on Intel’s chips) and 
advance samples of new Intel microprocessors.   
Intergraph sues Intel, asserting that Intel’s microprocessors infringe on Intergraph’s 
patents.  As negotiations fail, the relationship between Intel and Intergraph deteriorates.  
Intel withdraws the special benefits that Intergraph had been enjoying.  Intergraph asserts 
that Intel has monopoly power over the supply of microprocessors, that Intel’s 
withdrawal of these benefits will greatly damage Intergraph’s business, and that Intel’s 
conduct is anti-competitive.  Intel claims that its commercial response to Intergraph’s 
lawsuit does not harm competition in any relevant market and that the Courts should not 
intervene to favor Intergraph in their patent dispute.  
Is Intel’s conduct anti-competitive and thus illegal under the antitrust laws?  That is the central 
question explored in this chapter. 
After an investigation lasting several months, in June 1998 the Federal Trade Commission 
brought an antitrust lawsuit against Intel Corporation based on Intel’s conduct towards 
Intergraph, and similar conduct towards Digital Equipment Corporation and Compaq, all in the 
context of disputes where Intel was accused of patent infringement.  The FTC charged that 
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Intel’s practices were an abuse of Intel’s monopoly position in microprocessors.
1  The Chairman 
of the FTC described the FTC’s case against Intel as “one of the most widely noted antitrust 
enforcement actions involving intellectual property.” (Pitofsky 2001) 
The case attracted enormous media attention, in part because it took place contemporaneously 
with the Justice Department’s monopolization case against Microsoft.  Commentators asked 
whether the FTC was heading in a whole new direction with antitrust, since Intel’s conduct was 
directed primarily at its customers rather than at its competitors, the normal (direct) victims in 
monopolization cases. (Weinstein 1998, 1999)  The FTC and Intel settled their dispute in March 
1999, literally on the eve of trial.  The FTC’s case against Intel, in conjunction with a related 
private lawsuit described below, helped to define the antitrust limits on what dominant firms can 
do to gain competitive advantage using their intellectual property.  
The next section provides some background for the case by discussing the tension between 
intellectual property rights and antitrust law, a tension that is evident in the FTC’s dispute with 
Intel, and by describing the role of patents in the semiconductor industry.  Section 3 provides a 
succinct summary of the facts surrounding Intel’s conduct in each of the three patent disputes 
identified by the FTC.  Section 4 explains the FTC’s theory of how Intel’s conduct was anti-
competitive. Section 5 presents Intel’s response.  Section 6 describes the settlement reached 
between the FTC and Intel.  The final section discusses legal and economic developments since 
the case was settled and remarks on the lasting implications of the Intel case. 
2.  The Role of Patents in the Semiconductor Industry 
The FTC’s case against Intel is first and foremost a case about intellectual property and 
antitrust:  where do intellectual property rights end and antitrust limits begin?  Before we turn to 
the antitrust issues that are central to the Intel case, we must first understand the role of patents, 
both in general and in the semiconductor industry. 
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A. The Tension Between Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust 
Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets – the primary forms of intellectual property – play an 
increasingly central role in our economy.  Many companies consider their intellectual property to 
comprise their corporate crown jewels.  Pharmaceutical companies place great value on the 
patents that protect their blockbuster new drugs.  Hollywood is tireless in defending its 
copyrighted movies and music from unauthorized use.  Microsoft zealously guards the 
copyrighted source code for its Windows and Office software.  IBM earns substantial revnues 
each year by licensing its patents and trade secrets.  Intel attaches enormous value on the patents 
that it has obtained, and the trade secrets it controls, in the semiconductor field.  
The central role played by intellectual property reflects the fact that economic growth is often 
driven by innovation, and corporate competitive advantage often results from research and 
development (R&D) activities that give rise to patents, trade secrets, or copyrights.  Large 
companies like Microsoft and Intel invest billions of dollars each year in R&D. 
Strong or dominant companies increasingly rely on intellectual property rights to earn a return on 
their R&D investments and to protect their market positions.  Under these conditions, the tension 
that has always existed between intellectual property law – which grants innovators certain rights 
to exclude others from practicing their inventions – and antitrust law – which seeks to limit 
monopoly power and to promote competition – has become more visible and more important to 
our economy.  As noted by Shapiro and Varian (1999), the proper treatment of intellectual 
property rights under the antitrust laws has become a more pressing and more central policy 
topic as we move into the “Information Age.”  Gilbert and Tom (2001) document that innovation 
and intellectual property rights became more common elements of antitrust cases brought by the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice during the 1990s.
2 
In recognition of the growing importance of intellectual property in our economy, and the need 
to articulate how intellectual property rights intersect with the antitrust laws, in April 1995 the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission jointly 
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issued their “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.”
3   These “IP 
Guidelines” seek to inform the business community as to how licensing arrangements will be 
evaluated by the two antitrust enforcement agencies.    
While the IP Guidelines have been well received, guidelines by their nature involve general 
principles and hypothetical situations; they cannot substitute for actual cases.  Intel believed that 
its licensing practices complied with the FTC’s own Guidelines; the FTC obviously felt 
otherwise.   The FTC’s case against Intel, along with the related private case involving Intel and 
Intergraph, provide additional guidance, above and beyond that in the IP Guidelines, to 
companies seeking to use their intellectual property rights to gain commercial advantage. 
B. The Patent Thicket 
With this background, we can ask how patents are actually used in the semiconductor industry, 
the industry in which Intel competes.  Hall and Ziedonis (2001) provide a detailed discussion of 
precisely this issue.
4  They summarize their results as follows:  
Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents 
to appropriate returns to R&D.  Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has 
risen dramatically since the mid-1980s.  We explore this apparent paradox by conducting 
interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. 
semiconductor firms during 1979-1995.  The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening 
of U.S. patent rights spawned ‘patent portfolio races’ among capital-intensive firms, but 
it also facilitated entry by specialized firms.  (Hall and Ziedonis, p. 101) 
The increased patenting activity has created a “patent thicket” in the semiconductor industry.
5  
The extent of the problem can be seen by looking at some basic data on patenting.  Figure #1 
shows that the number of U.S. patents issued each year containing the word “microprocessor,” 
“processor,” or “CPU” in their abstracts more than doubled during the 1990s to 4714 in the year 
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1998.  Table #1 gives a breakdown for a number of companies in the microprocessor industry. 
The cumulative effect: over 25,000 microprocessor patents were issued from 1988 to 1998.  
To some extent, this surge in patenting simply reflects the highly innovative nature of the 
semiconductor industry.  For the purposes of the FTC’s case against Intel, however, the key point 
is that the role of patents in the semiconductor industry in the 1990s bore little resemblance to 
the “classical” role of patents on which the FTC’s theory was based.  According to the classical, 
one might say romantic, view of patents, inventors responsible for major inventions rely on the 
patent system to prevent others from copying their discoveries.  While this view fits the 
pharmaceutical industry reasonably well, patents play a radically different role in the 
semiconductor industry.  To see why, one must first understand three important ways in which 
patents in our economy today differ from the classical role of patents just described.   
First, many companies rely rather little on patents to appropriate the returns from their R&D 
activities.  (Levin, et. al. 1987, Cohen, et. al. 2000.)  Instead, companies in many industries rely 
on trade secrets and time-to-market advantages to earn returns on their R&D expenditures.   
Second, the propensity to patent (patents issued per dollar of R&D) has risen as more companies 
engage in defensive patenting.  Defensive patenting refers to the practice of seeking patents in 
order to defend oneself from patent infringement actions brought by others.  Under this strategy, 
the company does not plan to assert its patent proactively against others, but it can counterattack 
with its own patent infringement claims if sued for infringement (Kortum and Lerner 1998,  Hall 
and Zeidonis 2001).   
Third, there have been increasing concerns about the operation of the patent system itself  
(Merges 1999). The general thrust of the criticism is that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
has been too generous in granting patent rights.  A common criticism is that the PTO lacks 
sufficient expertise to determine whether many patent applications in fact represent new and 
useful inventions as required under patent law.   
C. Opportunism and “Hold-Up” by Patent Holders 
Consider what all this means from the perspective of a successful company like Intel.  Each time 
Intel designs and produces a new microprocessor, Intel faces some risk that it will be sued for Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 6 of 25 
patent infringement.  A company suing Intel for patent infringement can be expected to ask the 
court for an injunction forcing Intel to stop shipping its microprocessors; both Intergraph and 
Digital sought such injunctions.  Once Intel has invested billions of dollars in R&D and in a 
fabrication facility designed to make its latest chips, the losses Intel would suffer, were it forced 
to shut down production, would be staggering.  In this very real sense, a type of “judo 
economics” is at work in the industry: the larger are a company’s revenues, the more vulnerable 
is that company to a patent infringement lawsuit, other things equal. 
If the classical view of patents applied, this would be a minor problem.  Intel would merely 
refrain from copying patented technology, and it could avoid the risk of a devastating injunction 
against its flagship products.  In the presence of the patent thicket, however, it is much harder for 
Intel to avoid this risk.  A single microprocessor can potentially infringe on hundreds if not 
thousands of patents, many of which were not issued, and thus were invisible to Intel, when Intel 
was designing that microprocessor.  Since many companies are working on similar aspects of 
semiconductor technology in parallel, and since patent applications are secret, it is common for 
one company to obtain a patent on a process or design element that was simultaneously 
developed and used by another company.  The combination of simultaneous discovery, secrecy 
of patent applications, lags in the issuing of patents, a patent office that is generous to patent 
applicants, and the presumption of validity afforded to patents creates a potent mix.   
The FTC’s economic expert, Professor F.M. Scherer, stressed the danger of hold-up in his 
testimony at the FTC’s Hearings on Global Innovation-Based Competition in 1995: 
Smaller firms, and even some rather large firms trying to develop a new product, are 
essentially finding themselves in a situation just like walking through a mine field: There 
are lots of unexploded patents out there, and you might just step on one and have your 
corporate leg blown off…. I find it a rather scary situation, to be honest. See 
www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC112995.htm.    
Clearly, some patent holders will be in a position to engage in opportunistic behavior relative to 
Intel.  Intel is keenly aware of the dangers of hold-up and attempts to manage those risks, in part 
by entering into broad cross-licenses with others in the industry, such as IBM.  Under these 
cross-licenses, each company can design and produce its products without fear of infringing on 
the other’s patents.  These licenses thus afford “design freedom,” but not the freedom to copy.  Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 7 of 25 
The rapid pace of technological advance in the industry in the presence of many such cross 
licenses attests to their pro-competitive nature.  As Hall and Ziedonis (2001) note, semiconductor 
companies seek patents in large part to be in a better position to negotiate these cross licenses. 
While cross-licenses between major players in the industry have proven effective, they are not as 
well suited to situations where the revenues at risk on the two sides are sharply different.  When 
cross licenses are negotiated, each side makes the case that its patent portfolio is strong and that 
the other side is earning substantial revenue (and profits) selling products that infringe these 
patents.  When one side has few or no revenues at risk, that party gains an advantage in 
bargaining.  For this reason, patent infringement actions brought by industry outsiders, or by 
firms with small market shares, can be the most difficult to resolve through cross-licensing.  
Texas Instruments is widely seen as having decided to exploit its patents to earn licensing 
revenues after its business took a turn for the worse (Grindley and Teece, 1997).  The extreme 
case of this tactic occurs when a firm that holds patents, but engages in no design or 
manufacturing activities, brings suit against a major industry player.  For example, TechSearch 
sued Intel in 1998 asserting that Intel’s Pentium chips infringed patents owned by TechSearch.
6  
3.  Intel’s Conduct During Intellectual Property Disputes 
The facts surrounding the episodes giving rise to the FTC’s case are relatively simple and for the 
most part undisputed.
7  For this reason, the FTC’s case was largely about the proper legal and 
economic standard for conduct by a dominant firm, not a messy dispute over the facts, which 
makes the case especially attractive from the perspective of the antitrust economist. 
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A. Intergraph Corporation 
The basic facts of the Intergraph dispute were described above.  Some additional detail is useful, 
however, to understand better just how the dispute arose between Intergraph and Intel. 
In 1987, Intergraph acquired the “Clipper” microprocessor technology from Fairchild Industries.  
Until 1993, Intergraph developed this technology for use in Intergraph’s computer systems.   
Beginning in 1993, Intergraph gradually shifted from using the Clipper technology to building 
workstations and servers based on Intel’s Pentium microprocessor architecture.  By 1996, all of 
Intergraph’s hardware sales were Intel-based systems. 
In 1997, Intergraph informed a number of makers of computer systems, original equipment 
manufacturers, or OEMs, that they were allegedly infringing certain Intergraph patents.  These 
OEMs requested indemnification from Intel because the alleged infringement was based on these 
OEMs’ use of Intel’s microprocessors.  Following these OEM requests, Intel sought to negotiate 
a cross-license with Intergraph.  After the two companies were unable to reach agreement on the 
terms of a cross-license, Intel exercised its right under nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with 
Intergraph to seek the return of intellectual property previously disclosed by Intel to Intergraph in 
the form of trade secrets and advance samples of unannounced products.  Following indications 
that Intergraph was willing to negotiate with Intel, Intel withdrew this request for the return of its 
intellectual property and renewed its effort to obtain a cross-license with Intergraph.  In 
November 1997, Intergraph filed a patent infringement suit against Intel in Federal Court in 
Alabama.
8  In response to Intergraph’s lawsuit, Intel demanded the return of its intellectual 
property from Intergraph.  In April 1998, the court handling the private action between 
Intergraph and Intel issued a preliminary injunction requiring Intel to provide Intergraph with 
advance product information, advance samples, and production microprocessors on terms 
available to certain other large Intel customers. 
According to the FTC’s Complaint, “Intel cut off Intergraph’s access to any of the Intel technical 
information necessary to continue developing in a timely and efficient manner new computer Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 9 of 25 
systems incorporating new Intel microprocessors.”  FTC Complaint, ¶29.  In particular, the FTC 
Complaint states that Intel: “cut off technical information that Intergraph needed in order to 
design systems based on Intel’s newest chips;”  “demanded return of microprocessor prototypes 
and refused to supply additional prototypes;” “failed to inform Intergraph of a bug Intel had 
previously discovered in an Intel chip that Intergraph was purchasing;” “acted to create 
uncertainty about Intergraph’s future source of supply of Intel microprocessors;” and “otherwise 
engaged in conduct to create a perception in the computer industry that Intergraph was no longer 
capable of bringing to market in a timely manner new computer system products that incorporate 
Intel’s latest microprocessor technology.”  FTC Complaint, ¶29 
B. Compaq Computer Corporation 
Compaq Computer Corporation (“Compaq”) was the largest manufacturer of personal computers 
in the world during the mid-1990s. Compaq’s 1997 revenues were $24.6 billion. The majority of 
Compaq’s revenues during this time period were based on sales of Intel-based computers.  
Compaq was Intel’s largest customer in 1997, purchasing more than $2 billion worth of Intel 
microprocessors.  As stated in the FTC Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial Brief (p. 36): “By 
manufacturing complementary components such as chipsets and motherboards, Compaq seeks to 
add value to its products – more features, greater reliability, and lower production costs.” 
However, the FTC states that “Compaq’s strategy of differentiating its computer systems came 
into conflict with Intel’s strategy for expediting the adoption of new Intel microprocessors by the 
largest number of OEMs.”  More specifically:  
In 1994, Intel accelerated the expansion of its business from microprocessors into the 
systems area.  Intel began to manufacture and sell chipsets and motherboards, and in 
some cases complete computer systems.  It did so in order to provide OEMs with a 
vehicle for launching new generations of Intel microprocessors.  By providing OEMs 
with a complete set of the building blocks needed to design Intel-based systems, Intel can 
speed the dissemination of each new generation of microprocessors.  Intel’s increased 
activity in the systems area heightened the risk that Intel would bump up against 
Compaq’s portfolio of system-level patents.” Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial Brief, p. 37. 
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As this quote reveals, the FTC recognized that Intel’s strategy of selling chipsets and 
motherboards – complements to Intel’s microprocessors – was designed to increase the sales of 
Intel’s microprocessors, clearly a pro-competitive goal. 
In November 1994, Compaq sued Packard Bell (another PC maker) for using patented Compaq 
technology in Packard Bell computer systems.  Since the allegedly infringing technology was 
part of Intel-supplied motherboards, Packard Bell requested indemnification from Intel. In May 
1995, Intel formally intervened in the suit between Compaq and Packard Bell.  Intel then stopped 
supplying Compaq with access to its trade secrets regarding Intel’s Pentium II and Merced 
microprocessors, both of which were then in the design stage.  Intel did not cut off the flow of all 
confidential information, and it did not demand the return of all Intel confidential information 
held by Compaq.  Intel and Compaq executed a cross-license in January 1996 which ended the 
dispute between the two companies.   
The FTC alleged that Intel’s conduct “had a significant adverse effect on Compaq’s ability to 
develop and bring to market in a timely manner computer systems based on Intel 
microprocessors, and would have posed an even more significant long-term threat to Compaq’s 
business if Compaq had not agreed to license its technology to Intel.”  FTC Complaint, ¶37.  
Intel asserted that Compaq was not in fact delayed in introducing the products to which the trade 
secrets withheld by Intel related. 
C. Digital Equipment Corporation 
Digital Equipment Corporation (“Digital”) also designs and sells computer systems that 
incorporate Intel microprocessors.  In 1997, Digital’s sales of Intel-based systems accounted for 
roughly $2 billion of Digital’s $14 billion of revenues.  Digital purchased about $250 million 
worth of Intel microprocessors in 1997.   
Unlike Intergraph and Compaq, Digital designed, developed, manufactured, marketed and sold 
its own microprocessor products under the trade name “Alpha.”  Digital’s Alpha 
microprocessors made relatively few sales, but they achieved a high level of performance during 
the mid- to late-1990s.  As the FTC noted: Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 11 of 25 
Alpha has been able to garner only a small share of the microprocessor market, in 
significant part because software developers have generally not created Alpha versions of 
their Windows NT applications.  In network industries parlance, Alpha has been unable 
to generate the “positive feedback” necessary to establish itself as a standard architecture.  
Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial Brief, p. 32. 
Although not Intel’s primary competitor, the Alpha microprocessor was one of the rivals of the 
new IA-64 microprocessors under development at Intel, including the “Merced” microprocessor, 
since introduced as Intel’s high-end Itanium chip. 
In May 1997, Digital sued Intel, alleging that Intel’s Pentium processors infringed ten of 
Digital’s patents.  According to the FTC, “Intel responded to Digital’s lawsuit by publicly 
denying Digital access to any of the Intel technical information needed to continue developing in 
a timely and efficient manner new computer systems incorporating new Intel microprocessors.” 
FTC Complaint, ¶19.  As in the Intergraph case, Intel exercised its rights under its NDA with 
Digital, demanding that Digital return Intel’s technical information and prototypes. 
In November 1997, Intel and Digital settled their dispute.  This settlement had three key 
components.  First,  the two companies entered into a cross-license, giving each company a 
license to the other’s patents.  Second, Intel purchased an underutilized chip fabrication facility 
from Digital at book value, arguably well above its market value.  Third, Intel granted favorable 
pricing to Digital for future purchases of Intel microprocessors. Intel also assured Digital a 
continued supply of Alpha chips from the chip fabrication plant that Intel was acquiring. 
The FTC investigated Digital’s settlement with Intel separately, because the settlement involved 
the acquisition by Intel of a Digital fabrication facility.  The FTC’s basic concern with the 
settlement itself  was that Digital would become dependent upon Intel for making Digital’s Alpha 
chips, and thus that Digital would become a less effective or less independent competitor to Intel 
as a result of their settlement.  The FTC resolved these concerns by entering into a consent order 
with Digital in April 1998 to ensure that Digital would retain sources for the design and 
production of Alpha chips that were independent of Intel.
9   Subsequent events have shown that 
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Digital’s Alpha microprocessor is not in fact an especially attractive product in the 
microprocessor market.  Compaq later acquired Digital and phased out the Alpha 
microprocessor, which never attracted a large base of customers. 
By no means did the FTC’s approval of the Digital/Intel settlement end Intel’s entanglements 
with the FTC, however.  To the contrary: partly as a result of its inquiry into the Digital/Intel 
settlement, the FTC’s attention became focused on the tactics that Intel had used in its 
negotiations with Digital.  The FTC’s approval of the Digital/Intel settlement did not imply FTC 
approval of the tactics used by Intel in reaching that settlement.  To the contrary, finding that 
Intel had employed similar tactics in prior disputes with Intergraph and Compaq, the FTC 
decided to bring an antitrust case against Intel for its conduct in these three episodes. 
4.  The FTC’s Theory 
Although some within the FTC felt that Intel’s conduct was clearly “unfair,” the FTC fashioned a 
complaint against Intel that contained the standard elements of a Sherman Act monopolization 
case: monopoly power in a relevant antitrust market combined with anti-competitive conduct to 
fortify that monopoly.
10 
A. Intel Had Monopoly Power 
Since the FTC’s case was based on the claim that Intel’s conduct constituted monopolization, the 
FTC needed first to show that Intel had monopoly power in some well-defined relevant antitrust 
market.  The FTC alleged that Intel had monopoly power in the market for general-purpose 
microprocessors. 
The FTC supported this proposition by stating that “sales of Intel microprocessor products have 
accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total dollar sales of general-purpose 
microprocessors worldwide for each of the last five years.”  FTC Complaint, ¶6.  The FTC also 
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described the entry barriers into the microprocessor market.  The FTC listed sunk-cost 
investment and long development times, economies of scale, network effects, intellectual 
property rights, and reputational barriers as barriers to entry.    
B. Intel’s Conduct Harmed Competition 
Next, the FTC claimed that Intel’s conduct harmed competition in Intel’s monopoly market, 
namely the market for general-purpose microprocessors.   But how could Intel’s conduct would 
have an adverse impact on competition in the market for general-purpose microprocessors, 
where Intel’s most direct competitor was Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), who was not a 
customer of Intel and not subject to the tactics at issue?  The FTC Complaint (¶39) stated: 
Because patent rights are an important means of promoting innovation, Intel’s coercive 
tactics to force customers to license away such rights diminishes the incentives of any 
firm dependent on Intel to develop microprocessor-related technologies. Because most 
firms who own or are developing such technologies are vulnerable to retaliation from 
Intel, the natural and probable effect of Intel’s conduct is to diminish the incentives of the 
industry to develop new and improved microprocessor and related technologies. 
Consequently, Intel’s conduct entrenches its monopoly power in the current generation of 
general-purpose microprocessors and reduces competition to develop new 
microprocessor technology and future generations of microprocessor products. 
This was the essence of the FTC’s complaint: that the “natural and probable effect of Intel’s 
conduct” would be to discourage “the industry” from developing “microprocessor-related 
technologies” and thereby entrench Intel’s monopoly power.  Notice that the FTC’s theory is 
based on the proposition that “most firms who own or are developing such technologies are 
vulnerable to retaliation from Intel.”  This proposition will be tested below. 
At the  time the FTC issued its complaint against Intel, its press release further articulated the 
FTC’s theory of harm to competition: 
Innovation is critical to economic progress, and patents play a crucial role in encouraging 
that innovation. Intel’s great contributions to this country’s economic growth have been 
encouraged and protected by patents in the design and manufacturing processes for its 
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semiconductor products. But if Intel can use its monopoly position in the market for 
microprocessors to prevent other firms from enforcing their own patents, other firms will 
have little incentive to invent new features to challenge Intel’s dominance. As a 
monopolist, Intel can compete by producing better, cheaper and more attractive products. 
It cannot act to cement its monopoly power by preventing other firms from challenging 
its dominance. Intel has acted illegally. It has used its monopoly power to impede 
innovation and stifle competition.
11 
In short, the FTC saw Intel’s conduct as a form of expropriation of the patent rights of others 
through “coercion.”  If Digital could not protect its innovations from copying by Intel, the FTC 
argued, Digital would have less incentive to innovate in the future.  Similarly, the FTC argued 
that OEMs such as Compaq and Intergraph might use their own “microprocessor-related” 
innovations to help sponsor competition by an Intel rival, but such sponsorship would be less 
attractive if other OEMs using Intel’s chips could match these same innovations. 
C. Intel’s Conduct Had No Efficiency Basis 
Under the antitrust laws, even a dominant firm that has acted in a manner that excludes 
competitors can defend itself by showing that its conduct served a legitimate business purpose.  
The FTC asserted that Intel’s conduct, in each of the three disputes described above, “was not 
reasonably necessary to serve any legitimate, procompetitive purpose.”
12   
In fact, the FTC went even further, inferring anti-competitive intent from Intel’s actions.  
Specifically, the FTC took the view that Intel sacrificed short-term profits by disrupting its 
relationships with valuable customers, and doing so could only have been profitable because 
Intel stood to benefit over the longer run by protecting its monopoly. 
                                                 
11 FTC Press Release, June 8, 1998, “Intel Abuses its Monopoly Power in Violation of Federal Law: Agency 
Charges World’s Largest Microprocessor Manufacturer Cut Off Customers and Competitors in Order to Stifle 
Competition and Impede Innovation.”  See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9806/intelc.htm.  
12 FTC Complaint ¶30 (Intergraph), ¶36 (Compaq), ¶20 (Digital). Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 15 of 25 
5.  Intel’s Response to the FTC’s Theory 
Intel had a radically different view than the FTC on all of these issues.
13 
A. Competition Faced by Intel 
Intel argued that it lacked monopoly power over microprocessors.  Intel emphasized two aspects 
of the microprocessor market.  First, the price reductions and performance improvements for 
microprocessors have been simply extraordinary.  Moore’s Law, which states that 
microprocessor performance doubles roughly every 18 months, has been operating for some 
twenty years.  One is hard pressed to find a market where consumers have experienced greater 
improvements in performance, and reductions in price, over such a sustained period of time.  
Intel, a great manufacturer, has continually pushed prices down and introduced dramatically 
faster and faster chips.  Intel questioned whether this is the behavior of a monopolist. 
Second, there have been regular price wars and market-share skirmishes between Intel and its 
most direct rival, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).  Here is one rendition from a New York 
Times article (Fisher 1999) reporting the price war that broke out between Intel and AMD just 
one month before the FTC was set to go to trial against Intel:  
“Anyone who has watched the semiconductor industry for a while has seen this chain of 
events play out time and time again.  Intel brings out a new generation of microprocessor; 
Advanced Micro rushes to offer a compatible product but manufacturing glitches keep 
volume low.  Then, when Advanced Micro catches up and is ready to ship increased 
quantities, Intel cuts prices and prepares for the next generation of products.”  
In short, Intel argued that it was an aggressive and successful competitor in a market that was 
generating enormous benefits to consumers. 
Although Intel disputed the FTC’s assertion that Intel had monopoly power in the market for 
general-purpose microprocessors, the analysis below of Intel’s conduct assumes that Intel indeed 
                                                 
13 The most complete description of Intel’s position available to the public is Respondent Intel’s Trial Brief [Public 
Version], filed February 25, 1999; see http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/intelbrief.pdf.  Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 16 of 25 
had such power.
14  In the context of the disputes described above, this assumption implies that 
Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital had limited ability to replace Intel’s microprocessors with 
microprocessors from other suppliers.   The analysis below further assumes, as alleged by the 
FTC, that Intel’s refusal to provide trade secrets and advance product samples imposed 
substantial costs on Intergraph, Compaq and Digital.
15  
B. Intel’s “IP for IP” Policy 
Intel also had an entirely different perspective than the FTC regarding the rationale behind its 
conduct and the competitive effects of the tactics it used when faced with patent infringement 
lawsuits by Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital.   From Intel’s perspective, the episodes with 
Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital were just three of many instances in which Intel had to deal 
with the exploding number of patents in the semiconductor industry and the ever-present danger 
of being “held-up” by patent holders acting opportunistically. 
Keenly aware of the patent thicket, Intel had developed a policy of “IP for IP.”  Under this 
policy, Intel would use its intellectual property rights to negotiate cross-licenses and to defend 
itself if sued for infringement.  The FTC’s case was a direct attack on Intel’s “IP for IP” policy.   
From Intel’s perspective, the FTC wanted Intel to disarm unilaterally by continuing to provide 
trade secrets and other valuable IP to companies that were asserting their IP against Intel. 
Intel believed that its policy of “IP for IP” was a natural – and legal – way to use its valuable 
intellectual property to gain design freedom so that it could make the very best chips, to reduce 
its payments of royalties, and to limit its exposure to hold-up.  While far from perfect as a 
defense – Intel was still at a strategic disadvantage by virtue of its enormous microprocessor 
revenues – this policy helped Intel be a more effective competitor without involving the 
offensive use of Intel’s patents.  In other words, Intel saw its policy of “IP for IP” as appropriate 
in the context of the wave of defensive patenting, and in the presence of the patent thicket in its 
industry.  Intel’s documents and the testimony of Intel’s executives consistently supported this 
                                                 
14 The author’s assignment in the litigation was to analyze the effects of Intel’s conduct under the assumption that 
Intel had monopoly power, as alleged by the FTC. Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 17 of 25 
view that Intel’s policy of “IP for IP” was a defensive strategy to deal with the patent thicket and 
not designed to deter other industry members from engaging in innovation. 
In contrast, the FTC’s position was that Intel had no legitimate business justification for its 
actions.  As noted above, the FTC took the position that Intel had previously benefited from 
offering technical assistance and confidential information to Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital, so 
Intel’s decision to restrict or reduce the supply of confidential information and technical support 
to these companies was unjustified.   
From Intel’s perspective, this aggressive strategy directed against its customers made 
sense because its objective was the preservation of its monopoly, and it was willing to 
reduce its short-run profits to do so.”  Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial Brief, p.2 
By terminating Intergraph’s, Digital’s, and Compaq’s access to product information and 
samples, Intel gave up the benefits it obtained from the cooperative relationship it had 
previously enjoyed with each company. ...   Aspen teaches that the sacrifice of short term 
benefits is evidence of anticompetitive purpose and nature. Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial 
Brief, pp. 46-47. 
The central economic issue here is not especially complex.  Let us suppose that Intel’s tactics 
had the purpose and effect of allowing Intel to negotiate more favorable terms for cross-licenses 
with Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital than Intel could have obtained had it continued to provide 
its trade secrets and advance product samples to those companies.  In other words, suppose that 
Intel’s tactics allowed Intel lower its royalty costs and perhaps improve the quality of its chips 
(by achieving greater design freedom).  Are these “legitimate business justifications”?   
The ability to achieve lower costs and improved product quality are the essence of  “competition 
on the merits.”  Intel’s efforts to reduce its royalty costs and to achieve greater design freedom 
by bargaining using its own intellectual property should at the very least count as a pro-
competitive benefits, against which any anti-competitive effects should be balanced. In short, 
there is no economic basis for the FTC’s position that Intel’s attempt to lower its costs and to 
obtain design freedom somehow do not count as a “legitimate business” objective. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 This proposition does not follow from the assumption that Intel had monopoly power, since Intel never refused to 
sell its microprocessors to these companies.   Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 18 of 25 
This conclusion is strengthened once one recognizes the perils facing Intel, and others, who are 
vulnerable to hold-up as a result of the patent thicket.  Recall that both Intergraph and Digital 
sought injunctive relief to enjoin Intel from selling its flagship microprocessor products, while 
Compaq sought to enjoin Intel’s sales of motherboards.   As noted above, once Intel has sunk 
substantial costs in the design and production of its microprocessors, Intel may be subject to 
hold-up by patent holders whose actual contributions fall far short of the royalties they can 
extract from Intel.  In fact, Intergraph fit the hold-up pattern quite well: Intergraph had already 
exited the microprocessor business and was trying to mine older patents.  The Digital situation 
also fit the hold-up pattern: Digital’s Alpha microprocessor had not been selling well, Digital 
appeared to be seeking a graceful exit strategy, and Digital in fact gained considerable financial 
benefits from its settlement with Intel, as described above. 
The FTC’s theory seemed especially strained in the cases of Compaq and Intergraph, which were 
simply not microprocessor rivals of Intel.   The FTC did manage to construct a theory of how 
Intel’s conduct towards Compaq and Intergraph could harm competition in the microprocessor 
market, but a far simpler explanation of Intel’s conduct fit the facts very well: Intel was using its 
own IP as a bargaining chip in negotiations with others asserting their IP against Intel.   
The FTC’s “no business justification” position (a) did not seem accurately to reflect the role of 
patents in the semiconductor industry, especially the patent thicket; (b) gave little or no weight to 
the necessity and pro-competitive effects in this industry of cross-licenses that enable design 
freedom and reduce royalty payments, and (c) appeared to discount the very real danger of 
“hold-up” faced by Intel and other semiconductor manufacturers.  
C. The Effect of Intel’s Conduct on Microprocessor Competition 
Intel also hotly disputed the FTC’s claim that Intel’s conduct had harmed competition in the 
microprocessor market.   
The FTC asserted that “Intel’s conduct preserved its monopoly by guaranteeing Intel’s access to 
innovative technology.” (Complaint Counsels’ Pretrial Brief, p. 42)  In other words, by insuring 
that it could offer the most advanced microprocessors, the FTC stated that Intel’s monopoly 
position would be preserved.  This notion – that it is anti-competitive for a monopolist to use its Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 19 of 25 
monopoly power to negotiate for better or cheaper inputs and thus to improve its product – is 
misguided.   True, such cost reductions and product improvements will make it harder for others 
to topple the monopoly; but lower costs and higher quality are the essence of competition and 
should be encouraged.  Exchanging one’s own intellectual property to lower royalty costs and to 
help gain the necessary IP rights to make improvements is therefore also pro-competitive. 
The FTC also asserted that “Deterring innovation was another means for Intel to preserve its 
monopoly.”  “The evidence will show that the ability of Intel to force licenses to the technology 
it desires will, over time, dull the incentive of other firms to innovate.”  (Complaint Counsels’ 
Pretrial Brief, pp. 43-44).  Here we have a coherent theory that can in principle be tested: Did 
Intel’s conduct induce Intel’s microprocessor rivals to reduce their innovative effects?   In fact, 
the FTC’s theory of harm to innovation failed to hold up to empirical testing. 
The starting point for testing the FTC’s theory is the identification of Intel’s primary 
microprocessor rivals.  As noted above, the most direct rival was AMD.  Other companies with 
the capability to engage in microprocessor innovation included IBM, Sun, Hewlett-Packard, 
Digital, Samsung, Motorola, Silicon Graphics, Texas Instruments, Toshiba, and Hitachi.
16  We 
can thus sharpen the test of the FTC’s theory to the following question: Did Intel’s conduct 
induce these companies, who have the capability to engage in microprocessor innovation, to 
reduce their innovative efforts? 
Observe that two conditions must hold for the FTC’s theory even to get off the ground with 
respect to a specific microprocessor company:  (1) that company must be a customer of Intel who 
receives Intel’s trade secrets and advance product samples; and (2) that company must not have a 
cross-license with Intel, or else it would already have licensed its patents to Intel in return for a 
license to Intel’s patents.
17  In fact, none of Intel’s competitors identified by the FTC met these 
two conditions.  AMD and Sun, for example, do not purchase microprocessors from Intel.  IBM, 
for example, has a cross-license with Intel.  (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 28-29) 
                                                 
16 Recall that the analysis here assumes that Intel has monopoly power.  Therefore, this list of rivals is best thought 
of as the list of firms that are best placed to engage in innovation that will erode Intel’s monopoly power.  
17 It is theoretically possible that the future innovation incentives of a company that has signed a cross-license with 
Intel could be affected by Intel’s conduct, since these cross-licensees have finite duration. Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 20 of 25 
Despite this formidable obstacle, the FTC attempted to prove that Intel’s conduct “chilled” 
innovation activity.  But the evidence obtained during the discovery process simply did not 
support the “chill” theory.  One after another, the major innovators in the microprocessor field, 
including IBM, Sun, Hewlett-Packard, and Digital testified that their R&D efforts were not 
affected adversely by the Intel conduct at issue.  (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 5)  The FTC 
acknowledged that it had no evidence linking Intel’s conduct to R&D decision making at AMD, 
National Semiconductor (Cyrix), IBM, Sun, Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, Silicon Graphics, NEC 
Electronics, and several smaller companies, which together with Intel and Digital comprised all 
companies identified by the FTC as microprocessor innovators.  (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 13)  The 
evidence was especially strong that Digital’s innovation had not been adversely affected by 
Intel’s conduct.
18   
The FTC was forced to take the position that the harm to innovation would take place gradually, 
and could simply not be detected yet, despite the fact that Intel had been following its policy of 
IP for IP for some time.  As stated by the FTC’s economic expert, the consequences of Intel’s 
actions would “unravel over a period of probably ten or so years, and it’s just too early to assess 
those consequences.” (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 29)    
6.  Settlement and Consent Order 
Under the FTC’s procedures, the FTC action against Intel went before an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) at the FTC. Once the FTC’s complaint was issued in June 1998, a docket was 
opened with the ALJ presiding.  The actual hearing (trial) before the ALJ was scheduled to begin 
                                                 
18 Digital’s Chairman, Mr. Palmer, “testified that the company did not cancel, curtail, delay, defer, scale back, 
reduce, or otherwise limit any research and development related to microprocessors as a result of Intel’s conduct.” 
(Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 12)  Palmer also testified that Digital’s settlement with Intel had left the Alpha microprocessor 
in a stronger position to compete than it had been prior to the dispute with Intel, and that Digital’s ability and 
incentive to advance Alpha technology had increased as a result of the settlement with Intel.  (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 
13)  William Strecker, Digital Chief Technology Officer prior to Compaq’s acquisition of Digital, testified that 
Intel’s conduct had no effect on R&D related to the Alpha microprocessor.  (Intel’s Trial Brief, p. 13)  Digital in fact 
signed a long-term cross-license with Intel.  Even if Digital had received a higher lump-sum payment from Intel in 
the absence of Intel’s tactics, this would have no effect on Digital’s incentives to innovate during the long term of 
the cross license.  Alternatively, if Digital had received running royalties, we would expect Intel’s prices to be 
higher, harming consumers. Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 21 of 25 
in March 1999.  The FTC and Intel announced a settlement of their dispute on March 8, 1999.
19  
Under the consent order negotiated between the FTC and Intel,
20  Intel agreed to continue to 
provide its trade secrets and advance product samples to customers suing Intel for patent 
infringement, with one significant exception: Intel would have such an obligation only if the 
customer agreed not to seek an injunction against Intel’s manufacture and sale of its 
microprocessors.  According to the FTC’s Analysis to Aid Public Comment,
21 this exception:  
strikes an appropriate balance, on a prospective basis, between the interests of Intel and 
its customers. If a customer chooses to seek an injunction against Intel's microprocessors, 
it cannot, under the provisions of this Order, be assured of continuing to receive advance 
technical information about the very same microprocessors that it is attempting to enjoin. 
If an Intel customer nevertheless wishes to seek injunctive relief against Intel's 
manufacture, use, sale, offer to sell or importation, it remains free to do so, but without 
the protections in this Order. In all other circumstances, Intel is required to continue 
supplying technical information and product under the Proposed Order.  
The beauty of this compromise was that it met the essential needs of both the FTC and of Intel.  
In particular, the FTC obtained some protections for customers suing Intel for patent 
infringement, under the theory that customers’ ability to bring such lawsuits would serve to 
encourage their innovative efforts.  From Intel’s perspective, the settlement ended the FTC case 
against Intel and allowed Intel to bring its own intellectual property rights to bear in negotiations 
if the other party were seeking an injunction against Intel’s microprocessors, the very type of 
hold-up that was of greatest concern to Intel.  Both the FTC and Intel expressed satisfaction with 
the result, although Intel continued to assert that its conduct had not violated the antitrust laws. 
7.   Subsequent Developments 
Although it settled with the FTC, Intel’s litigation with Intergraph continued.  Recall that 
Intergraph had obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Intel to continue to provide it with 
trade secrets and advance samples.  Intel had appealed this injunction to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the appeals court that specializes in intellectual property disputes. 
                                                 
19 For the FTC Press Release announcing the settlement, see http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9903/intelcom.htm.  
20 The Consent Order can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm.  Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 22 of 25 
In a major decision issued in November 1999, the CAFC ruled strongly in Intel’s favor.
22  The 
Court strongly supported Intel’s view of its rights as a holder of intellectual property and of the 
limitations of Intergraph’s antitrust case against Intel.  In particular, the CAFC emphasized that 
Intergraph was not a competitor to Intel in the market in which Intel was alleged to have a 
monopoly, namely the microprocessor market.  Citing substantial precedent, and relying on the 
fact that Intergraph and Intel were in a customer/supplier relationship, not a competitive 
relationship, the CAFC could find no likelihood that Intel’s conduct, even if it harmed 
Intergraph, violated the Sherman Act.
23  Here are three key quotes from the CAFC decision: 
However, the Sherman Act does not convert all harsh commercial actions into antitrust 
violations.  Unilateral conduct that may adversely affect another's business situation, but 
is not intended to monopolize that business, does not violate the Sherman Act….  Intel's 
conduct with respect to Intergraph does not constitute the offense of monopolization or 
the threat thereof in any market relevant to competition with Intergraph.   
Intergraph provided no support for its charge that Intel’s action in withholding “strategic 
customer” benefits from Intergraph was for the purpose of enhancing Intel's competitive 
position.  … No threat or actual monopolization is asserted to flow from the various 
rejected patent license proposals.  Commercial negotiations to trade patent property rights 
for other consideration in order to settle a patent dispute is neither tying nor coercive 
reciprocity in violation of the Sherman Act.  Although the district court calls Intel's 
actions “hardball,” it is not the judicial role to readjust the risks in high-stakes 
commercial dealings.  
Despite the district court's sensitive concern for Intergraph’s well-being while it conducts 
its patent suit against Intel, there must be an adverse effect on competition in order to 
bring an antitrust remedy to bear.  The remedy of compulsory disclosure of proprietary 
information and provision of pre-production chips and other commercial and intellectual 
property is a dramatic remedy for antitrust illegality, and requires violation of antitrust 
law or the likelihood that such violation would be established.  In the proceedings whose 
record is before us, Intergraph has not shown a substantial likelihood of success in 
establishing that Intel violated the antitrust laws in its actions with respect to Intergraph, 
or that Intel agreed by contract to provide the benefits contained in the injunction. 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 See http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelanalysis.htm.  
22 {Get proper case cite.} 
23 On remand, the District Court dismissed Intergraph’s antitrust case against Intel in March 2000.  Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 23 of 25 
Intel’s perspective also has gained ground at the Federal Trade Commission itself.  The new 
Chairman of the FTC, Timothy Muris, has been quite explicit in his criticism of the approach 
taken by the Pitofsky Commission to monopolizations cases, including the Intel case:
24 
“FTC officials have pronounced their view regarding monopolization in court papers, 
speeches, and articles.  The agency appears to believe that in monopolization cases 
government proof of anticompetitive effects is unnecessary.  … In this article, I intend to 
demonstrate that the FTC’s position on this issue is wrong: wrong on the law, wrong on 
policy, and wrong on the facts.”  [footnotes omitted]  Muris (2000), p. 694 
The Intel case thus leaves us with a question that is central to the antitrust law and economics of 
monopolization cases: What must the government show in terms of competitive effects before a 
monopolist’s conduct is branded anti-competitive and thus illegal under the Sherman Act?  The 
FTC’s case against Intel may prove to have been the high-water mark for those who would set a 
low hurdle of proof of anti-competitive effects for the government in monopolization cases, and 
for those who would take a narrow view of what constitutes a “business justification” for 
conduct alleged by the Federal antitrust agencies to be anti-competitive. 
 
                                                 
24 Muris explicitly identifies concerns about hold-up as an area where the FTC is “wrong on the facts.”  “In rejecting 
suits by Intel’s customers as a justification for Intel’s refusal to supply information, the FTC appears to have ignored 
the implication of the relational contracts literature discussed [above.]”  (Muris 2000, p. 717)  Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 24 of 25 
 
References 
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John Walsh, (2000) “Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),” NBER Working Paper No. 
7552, February, www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf.  
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, (1995) Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property,” www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm. 
Fisher, Lawrence, (1999), “Price War Between Advanced Micro and Intel Ravages Chip 
Stocks,” New York Times, February 8, 1999. 
Gilbert, Richard, and Carl Shapiro, (1997), “Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property: The Nine No-No’s Meet the Nineties,” Brookings Papers on Economics: 
Microeconomics,  pp. 283-336. 
Gilbert, Richard, and Willard K. Tom, (2001), “Is Innovation King at the Agencies?  the 
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later,” Antitrust Law Journal,  vol. 69, no. 1, 
pp. 43-86. 
Grindley, Peter, and David J. Teece (1997), “Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and 
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics,” California Management Review, 
vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 1-34. 
Hall, Bronwyn, and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, (2001), “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995,”  Rand 
Journal of Economics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 101-128. 
Heller, M.A. and R. S. Eisenberg, (1998), “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in 
Biomedical Research,” Science, 280, 698-701. 
Klein, Joel I., (1997), “Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law,” available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm.  
Kortum, S. and J. Lerner, (1998), “Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is 
Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, vol. 48, pp. 247-304. 
Levin, Richard, Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, (1987) “Appropriating the 
Returns from Industrial R&D,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 783-820. 
Merges, Robert P., (1999), “As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, vol. 14, no. 2,  pp. 577-615. Shapiro on Intel, June 13, 2002, Page 25 of 25 
Muris, Timothy J., (2000), “The FTC and the Law of Monopolization,” Antitrust Law Journal, 
vol. 67, no. 3, pp. 693-723. 
Pitofsky, Robert, (2001), “Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of 
the New Economy,” Prepared Remarks at the Antitrust, Technology, and Intellectual 
Property Conference, Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, March 2, 2001, see 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.htm.  
Shapiro, Carl, (2001), “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard 
Setting,” in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott 
Stern, eds., National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian, (1999), Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network 
Economy, Harvard Business School Press. 
Takahashi, Dean, (1999), “Intel’s Bold Steps to Thwart Foe in Patent Case,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 16, 1999. 
Weinstein, Michael, (1998), “Intel Case Gives Antitrust Law a New Twist,” New York Times, 
June 9, 1998.  
Weinstein, Michael, (1999), “Antitrust Case Against Intel Stresses Customers, Not Rivals,” New 














1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Number of Patents Issued, By Year, 1988-1998